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1 
FOREWORD: PAVING THE PATH OF CYBERLAW 
Greg Lastowka† 
HORSES 
About sixteen years ago, Judge Frank Easterbrook explained to 
a group of early cyberlaw scholars that the field should be killed in 
its cradle.1  The tendency of cyberlaw scholars to mix legal theory 
with technologies, he claimed, was little more than an excuse for 
dilettantism.  Let the technologists focus on the technology, he 
argued, and let the law professors focus on the law’s first principles: 
tort, contract, property, and the like.  In Judge Easterbrook’s 
opinion, writing about the law of cyberspace was no different than 
writing about the law of horses.  There is no “law of the horse.”  
The horse is just an animal governed by the laws that governed 
everything else.  A legal focus on technology would not help shape 
the law, he stated, technology would simply receive the law we 
made for it. 
It turned out Judge Easterbrook was dead wrong—and the 
starry-eyed cyberlaw visionaries he chided were dead right.  This 
particular horse—the Internet—has indeed shaped the law and 
shaped it mightily.  It has not only shaped the law, but it has shaped 
society generally.  The cyberlaw pioneers addressed by Easterbrook 
could never have foreseen exactly how law and Internet technology 
would interact in coming years.2  They couldn’t even have seen 
where the technology was headed.  In 1996, when Judge 
Easterbrook told them to do some real work, Steve Jobs had yet to 
 
       †  Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law—Camden. 
 1. Frank H Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 207; see also Lawrence Lessig, Law of the Horse: What Cyber Law Might Teach, 
113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 501–03 (1999) (recounting Easterbrook’s address). 
 2. I should note that although the term “cyberlaw” originated in the 1990s, 
there were certainly a fair numbers of practicing lawyers and professors in the 
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s who researched and wrote about the intersection of 
computers and the law.  The popularity of “cyberlaw” as a term largely tracked the 
expansion of the dot-com boom.  Today, many cyberlaw professors (myself 
included) use a less flashy term for the basic survey course: “Internet and 
Computer Law.” 
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reclaim the helm of Apple, Google was still a graduate student 
project at Stanford, and Mark Zuckerberg was not even a teenager. 
But these legal scholars were onto something: they realized that 
powerful changes to society, and the law that governed it, were 
already underway. 
It is hard to overstate how much has changed since 1996. 
Sixteen year olds in America today, born in the year of 
Easterbrook’s address, arrived in a networked world.  They grew up 
without my early conviction that all answers to tough questions must 
be buried in the stacks of distant, dusty libraries.  The majority of 
them carry a gateway to universal knowledge (a.k.a. Google) on an 
always-handy cell phone.  This device also serves to coordinate their 
universe of friends, tweets, likes, comments, and shares.  It also, 
increasingly, is working on them, monetizing the data and 
preferences sprinkled through all of their social activity (often 
without their knowledge). 
More than ever, our networked society needs good Internet 
laws and capable legal guides.  It deserves a legal system that not 
only understands the way our key technologies operate, but has 
also considered carefully how best to protect those who use them. 
Legal scholars have a very important role to play in educating 
courts, practitioners, and society, a role that involves bridging the 
tricky gaps between legal theory, legal doctrine, and complex 
emerging technologies and practices.  This issue continues the 
work of earlier cyberlaw scholars by presenting the reader with 
careful and thoughtful explorations of contemporary legal issues 
raised by cloud computing, social networks, virtual worlds, internet 
access rights, digital forensics, and search engines. 
The path of cyberlaw is, at heart, about retooling our 
constantly changing laws for a constantly emerging future. The 
contributions in this volume work toward that end.  They provide 
the reader with close analysis of a broad range of legal 
controversies.  The work of paving the path of cyberlaw is not an 
easy task, but the authors in this issue tackle it with admirable skill 
and success.  
Ideally, if we could just glimpse a bit further into the future, we 
might avoid the sort of mistake that Judge Easterbook made in 
1996.  Judge Easterbook did not see the future that was on its way.  
In 2012, neither do we.  Surely, in the next sixteen years, some 
twelve year-old of today will upset the Internet’s apple cart.  Our 
digital technologies are not only complex, they are in a perpetual 
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state of evolution.  Code, like law, is made of flexible materials.3 
From the current vantage point of 2012, the technological 
landscape of 2028 is just as obscure as the current technological 
moment was in 1996.  How can we do better, looking toward the 
future to come? 
Perhaps we might look to the past for inspiration.  My small 
digression in this foreword will offer a tweak to Judge Easterbrook’s 
1996 pronouncement, one that I hope might provide some sense of 
continuity and tradition to balance cyberlaw’s seemingly perpetual 
novelty.  The past sixteen years of cyberlaw do not at all resemble 
the law of the horse.  However, they do bear some resemblance to 
the law of the car.4 
CARS 
Judge Easterbrook’s horse was already an antiquated 
technology in 1996.  Most of us—unless we live in certain spacious 
states, or are equiphiles, or are parents of equiphiles—gained our 
knowledge of horses from history, not experience.  The law of the 
car makes a far better foil for considering cyberlaw.  The car is, 
after all, the premier popular technology of the twentieth century 
and the second most important financial asset of families.  More 
importantly, the car was a technology that permanently stabled our 
horses and, in doing so, changed the face of the world. 5 
Initially, cars transformed the society by unleashing waves of 
human carnage.  Tens of thousands of people lost their lives each 
year to automobile accidents in the 1930s, a death toll surpassing 
any prior class of calamity.6  (One might argue that more than half 
of insurance law today is really just the law of the car.7)  Cars also 
changed the physical landscape in short order, giving birth not 
only to interstate highways but also to myriad new places of 
commerce and community: diners, motels, suburbs, gas stations, 
and strip malls.  Cars even changed the nature of families, 
 
 3. James Grimmelmann, Regulation by Software, 114 YALE L.J. 1719 (2004). 
 4. I should note that other cyberlaw scholars have drawn similar connections 
between the car and the Internet.  See Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Shaping Code, 
18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 319 (2004); Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, 
Cybertorts and Legal Lag: An Empirical Analysis, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 77 (2003) 
(describing the expansion of tort law specific to automobiles). 
 5. Susan W. Brenner, Law in an Era of Pervasive Technology, 15 WIDENER L.J. 
667, 709–714 (2005). 
 6. RUDI VOLTI, CARS AND CULTURE: THE LIFE STORY OF A TECHNOLOGY (2006). 
 7. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 5. 
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providing their owners with greater freedom and mobility in 
leisure, employment, and domicile. 
A law of the car emerged piece by piece.  Some of it was 
created via direct regulation, much like the direct regulations of 
the Internet we see today.  It is due to positive law that we school 
children in traffic regulations and enforce licensing requirements, 
design regulations, and emissions controls.8  These are all 
developments of positive law.  But much of modern autolaw was 
formed by judicial interpretation. 
Privacy, a key issue in cyberlaw, is just one example: the law has 
interpreted the car as a sort of semi-private mobile home.9  (Today 
it is exactly that for many, especially those hardest hit by job losses 
and foreclosures.10)  Accordingly, special laws of privacy had to be 
built around the car, separating, e.g., expectations of privacy in the 
trunk space from expectations of privacy on the floor space of the 
back seat.11  The Supreme Court in 2012 will again be puzzling over 
cars and privacy, this time with respect to warrantless GPS 
transmitters.12  Cyberlaw scholars have confronted similar puzzles 
regarding search and seizure in a digital world.13 
The automobile, like cyberspace, also gave birth to various new 
forms of crime and violence, testing rules of jurisdiction. 
Individuals with cars could escape local control by fleeing to new 
geographic frontiers.  This sort of freedom was especially alluring 
to criminals.  The “getaway car” played a key role in bank robberies, 
 
 8. See Kesan & Shah, supra note 5. 
 9. Carol Sanger, Girls and the Getaway: Cars, Culture, and the Predicament of 
Gendered Space, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 705 (1995). 
 10. See CBS News, Hard Times Generation: Families Living in Cars, 60 MINUTES 
(Nov. 27, 2011, 8:01 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18560_162-
57330802/hard-times-generation-families-living-in-cars/. 
 11. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 307 (1999)(“ We hold that 
police officers with probable cause to search a car may inspect passengers’ 
belongings found in the car that are capable of concealing the object of the 
search.”); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (“Until today, this Court 
has drawn a curious line between the search of an automobile that coincidentally 
turns up a container and the search of a container that coincidentally turns up in 
an automobile.”); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) (“[T]he 
opportunity to search is fleeting since a car is readily movable.”); Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132, 153–56 (1925) (observing the jurisdictional fluidity of 
vehicles). 
 12. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Casts a Wary Eye on Tracking by GPS, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/09/us/supreme-court-
casts-a-wary-eye-on-tracking-by-gps.html. 
 13. Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531 
(2005). 
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spurring state law enforcement to greater interstate coordination 
and ultimately requiring the expansion of federal police power. 
Cybercrime today is pushing governments in similar directions, as 
rogue online actors operate scams, steal data, and wage 
information wars from the relative safety of foreign jurisdictions. 
But perhaps the most important thing the automobile did to 
the law was to change the notion of the good life among the 
populace and our civic leaders.  Advertising of automobiles shaped 
our belief that our cars were not simply instrumental technologies, 
but desirable possessions as ends in themselves.  Car ownership 
became an important aspect of membership in civil society. 
Furthering the popular ownership and use of cars became a 
commonsense goal of public policy.  Similarly, today, consumers 
around the world still covet cars, but they also covet the latest smart 
phones and Internet gizmos, seeing them as passports to the good 
life of the twenty-first century.  As commentators in this issue note, 
there is a sense today that today’s firms and businesses must have a 
presence in social software—to ignore the technology is to be left 
behind. 
Our cultural embrace of cars brought us many benefits, but 
also many problems: an ongoing toll of fatal accidents, the decline 
of urban centers, an increased national dependence on fossil fuels 
(and resulting international armed conflicts), and the 
transformation of our planet’s environment.  The technology of 
computers and the Internet has brought us a similar mixed bag: 
powerful information tools, but significant threats as well—many of 
which are set forth in this volume.  Established understandings of 
privacy, copyright, evidence, ethics, human rights, and commerce 
have all been upended by cyberspace. 
Comparing the path of cyberlaw to the law of the car should 
be both troubling and encouraging to cyberlaw scholars.  It is 
troubling insofar as it illustrates how little influence law and 
government ultimately exerted on the tremendous social impact of 
automobiles.  The law rounded many of the rough edges from the 
automobile, but society largely stumbled into our current 
relationship with cars.  Market forces played a far greater role than 
rational deliberation.  To the pessimist, the path of autolaw is a 
story of technology setting government back on its heels.  The car 
transformed the world and for the most part, our legal system was 
powerless to foresee the vast changes the technology would 
unleash. 
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Yet the law of the car is encouraging insofar as it illustrates the 
potential of legal regulation to succeed in some contexts and for 
courts to produce just results.  If we delve into the law of the car, we 
can find tales of public servants and legal reformers doing their 
best to make that technology better in terms of safety, efficiency, 
infrastructure, and equity, often in the face of powerful 
opposition.14  Not all stories concerning the law of the car recount 
successes, but much good legal work, devoted to the furtherance of 
the public welfare, was done in the case of the car. 
This issue presents the same sort of important work in the field 
of cyberlaw, a field of considerably greater technological 
complexity and even more profound cultural implications.  The 
authors lay down scholarly cobblestones for the path of cyberlaw, 
attempting to provide us with surer footing as we proceed with this 
momentous new technology. 
EIGHT COBBLESTONES 
The articles survey their technological fields, harvest the 
applicable caselaw, condense the issues, and ultimately produce the 
sort of sound advice that will help courts, practitioners, legislators, 
and policy makers to move forward.  It is my pleasure to introduce 
them to the reader. 
Jon Penney, currently a Graduate Fellow at Oxford University, 
opens the volume with his article, Internet Access Rights: A Brief 
History and Intellectual Origins.  Penney discusses the recent Report 
filed by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 
Expression, Frank La Rue, which declares Internet Access to be a 
human right.  Penney’s article unpacks that statement’s 
implications and its intellectual pedigree.  As Penney explains, the 
right implies both a negative freedom from government inference 
as well as a positive entitlement of access to particular tools.  As 
Penney explains, the historical right to the “free flow of 
information” has given greater weight to negative freedoms, an 
approach which accords with cyberlibertarian philosophies.  
However, an exclusive focus on negative freedoms leaves neglected 
an important part of the political picture of access rights. 
 
 14. RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED: THE DESIGNED-IN DANGERS OF THE 
AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE (1965); Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and 
Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 257 (1986). 
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Professor Josh Fairfield’s contribution, Nexus Crystals: 
Crystallizing Limits on Contractual Control of Virtual Worlds, takes up 
the intersection of online contracts and digital copyright in the 
context of a recent case involving the massively-multiplayer game 
World of Warcraft.  Fairfield sketches out the complicated legal 
landscape that governs claims of infringement based on the breach 
of software licenses.  He then explains how the Ninth Circuit’s 
recent opinion in MDY v. Blizzard Entertainment required copyright 
owners to establish a copyright “nexus” in order to level 
infringement claims based on the breach of specific contractual 
provisions.  Fairfield explains how this ruling may, if nourished by 
subsequent jurists, ameliorate doctrinal imbalances currently 
plaguing copyright law.  As he explains, digital copyright in recent 
history has been unfortunately interpreted to invite software 
owners to engage in socially undesirable forms of anti-competitive 
behavior. 
Professor Eric Goldman, in his essay entitled Revisiting Search 
Engine Bias, considers one of the major players in today’s cyberlaw 
landscape, Google, which increasingly is becoming something 
more than a search engine company.  As Goldman explains, 
Google’s domination of the search engine market has fueled 
increasing scrutiny of potential bias in the results it provides to 
users.  Professor Goldman updates his former critique of search 
engine bias claims in light of recent changes in the market, 
changes in Google’s business practices, and changes in the political 
climate.  Taking stock of these he concludes that his position has 
changed very little: he finds no basis in law or policy for more 
closely regulating how Google displays search results. 
Roland Trope and Sarah Jane Hughes are both cyberlaw 
practitioners and scholars. Their contribution, Red Skies in the 
MorningProfessional Ethics Issues at the Dawn of Cloud Computing, 
looks at the emerging challenges that cloud computing and Web 
2.0 pose to professional ethics.  Trope and Hughes first consider 
the professional obligation of lawyers to stay abreast with current 
technologies.  Then they carefully outline the broad spectrum of 
risks to clients that is largely inherent to attorney use of cloud 
computing services.  Finally, they offer extensive advice regarding 
best practices for attorneys who choose to use cloud computing 
and Web 2.0 technologies. 
Katheryn Andresen is a practicing cyberlawyer and the author 
of The Law and Business of Computer Software.  Her contribution to 
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this issue, Marketing Through Social Networks: Business Considerations—
From Brand to Privacy, documents the commercial expansion of 
social networks, surveying the legal risks inherent in conducting 
business via these platforms.  As she explains, the law of privacy is 
an important consideration for any business adopting these 
technological tools.  In particular, those businesses subject to GLBA 
and HIPPA need to pay careful attention to the information they 
expose via social networks.  Anderson accepts that social networks 
are now a requirement of doing business with consumers, but 
advises companies on how they might craft policies to minimize 
their exposure. 
Robert Larson and Paul Godfread are practicing attorneys 
specializing in the law of intellectual property.  Their article, 
Bringing John Doe to Court: Procedural Issues in Unmasking Anonymous 
Internet Defendants, explores the legal problems facing those wishing 
to maintain anonymity on the Internet.  As they describe, many 
procedural tools are available for those who wish to pierce 
anonymity online.  Some of these tools abuse legal process to the 
detriment of anonymous speakers.  The authors suggest that both 
the judiciary and the legislature have failed to confront these sorts 
of abuses.  They offer four suggestions to courts wishing to curb 
inequitable litigation tactics in this arena. 
Sean Harrington is law student and an expert in digital 
forensics.  His contribution, Collaborating with a Digital Forensics 
Expert: Ultimate Tag-team or Disastrous Duo?, explores the fascinating 
range of legal and procedural questions being presented to courts 
and practitioners by the incredible volume of information being 
captured and stored on digital machinery and networks.  As 
Harrington describes, lawyers are being urged to work more closely 
with technologists, which raises important new legal questions 
about professional ethics, expertise, privilege, anti-hacking laws, the 
adversarial process, and third-party obligations.  Harrington’s 
article provides a comprehensive tour of the range of issues now 
facing lawyers collaborating with digital forensic experts. 
Adam Pabarcus, a recent graduate of the William Mitchell 
College of Law, contributes an electronic privacy article: Are 
“Private” Spaces on Social Networking Websites Truly Private? The 
Extension of Intrusion upon Seclusion. Pabarcus’s article closes the 
issue by reversing Penney’s opening article.  Instead of the right to 
communicate, Pabarcus explores the right to be let alone.  He does 
so by applying the common law privacy tort of “intrusion upon 
8
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seclusion” to virtual spaces, such as social networks.  After surveying 
the law, theory, and secondary literature on point, Pabarcus 
concludes that extension of the privacy tort to virtual spaces is 
warranted.  He sees support for this in the language of the 
Restatement, in the prior case law, and in the goals of public policy. 
The contributions to this issue are clear evidence that cyberlaw 
is not only alive and well, but that it is entering into its full maturity.  
These scholarly contributions do vital work by endeavoring to 
legally channel the use of powerful technologies to better serve the 
public good.  This is the path of cyberlaw. 
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